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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ON REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has granted the State's Petition for Rehearing in this 
case on the limited issue of whether Idaho Appellate Rule 17 applies to limit the efficacy 
of a request for an appeal tendered prior to a judgment of conviction becoming final. 
Mr. Gosch submits that it does not. However, even assuming that this Rule applies to 
the question of when a request for an appeal is effective under the standards articulated 
1 
in Roe v. Flores-Orfega1, Mr. Gosch submits that the case law governing the efficacy of 
prematurely filed notices of appeal should guide this Court's analysis. Under the liberal 
standards applied with regard to prematurely filed notices of appeal, Mr. Gosch's 
request would fall within a cognizable time frame for purposes of a prematurely filed 
notice of appeal and therefore would be legally effective. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
The prior Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings for Mr. Gosch's 
underlying post-conviction action were previously set forth in Mr. Gosch's Appellant's 
Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.2-10.) They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
On appeal, Mr. Gosch asserted that the district court erred in dismissing his post 
conviction petition because his trial counsel tendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
when trial counsel disregarded Mr. Gosch's directive to file an appeal following the jury 
verdict of guilt in his underlying criminal case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-21.) This Court 
held that the district court erred in dismissing this claim and in not granting Mr. Gosch 
relief in the form of re-entering his judgment of conviction and sentence so that he could 
file an appeal. (2012 Opinion No.47.) 
Thereafter, the State filed a Petition for Rehearing with this Court, along with a 
brief in support of this petition. (See Petition for Rehearing; Respondent's Brief in 
Support of Petition for Rehearing.) Following the filing of the State's Petition for 
Rehearing and the Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing, this Court 
1 Roe v. Flores-Orfega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
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granted the State's petition for rehearing solely on the limited issue of "Idaho Appellate 
Rule 17.,,2 (Order Granting Petition for Rehearing, entered on October 24, 2012.) 
2 Mr. Gosch notes that the State, in its brief in support of the petition for reheari~g, 
sought to re-litigate the appropriate standard of review for Mr. Gosch's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Roe v. Flores-Ortega. (See Respondent's Brief 
in Support of Petition for Rehearing, pp.7-B.) Given the limiting language of this Court's 
order granting the petition for rehearing, Mr. Gosch will not herein seek to re-litigate this 
issue that has been settled by this Court's prior opinion in this case. He does, however, 
note that he has previously responded to this argument and continues to assert the 
arguments presented in his prior Reply Brief as to the proper standards of review. (See 
Reply Brief, pp.3-7.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Is an unequivocal request for an appeal, clearly heard and understood by trial 
counsel, that was made following a jury verdict of guilt but prior to formal entry of 
a judgment of conviction and sentence, legally effective under the standards 
articulated in Roe v. Flores-Ortega and its progeny? 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel is permitted to disregard a clear directive 
to file an appeal where that directive is made prior to formal entry of a judgment 
of conviction and sentence, under the facts of this case, would Mr. Gosch's 
request for an appeal be legally effective under the application of I.A.R. 17(e) and 
case law regarding the validity of prematurely filed notices of appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
An Unequivocal Request For An Appeal, Clearly Heard And Understood By Trial 
Counsel, Made Following A Jury Verdict Of Guilt But Prior To Formal Entry Of A 
Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence, Is Legally Effective Under The Standards 
Articulated In Roe V. Flores-Ortega And Its Progeny 
A. Introduction 
The State makes several arguments on appeal regarding the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) regarding the premature filing of a 
notice of appeal. However, the State's arguments on rehearing are notably devoid of 
any authority regarding one basic proposition - whether the time limits for when a notice 
of appeal may be filed are determinative of whether a defendant's request of counsel to 
appeal are legally effective. 
Mr. Gosch submits that, where a defendant makes an unequivocal request for an 
appeal that is heard and understood by counsel, and this request is made at any time 
prior to the lapse of the trial court's jurisdiction through the expiration of the time to 
appeal, then the standards of Roe v. Flores-Ortega control and counsel is obligated to 
follow through with the ministerial task of filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the 
State's arguments regarding the proper interpretation of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) are irrelevant to 
the issue before this Court, as it is undisputed that Mr. Gosch's request for an appeal 
was made prior to the time for appeal actually lapsing. 
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B. An Unequivocal Request For An Appeal, Clearly Heard And Understood By Trial 
Counsel. Made Following A JUry Verdict Of Guilt But Prior To Formal Entry Of A 
Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence. Is Legally Effective Under The Standards 
Articulated In Roe V. Flores-Ortega And Its Progeny 
The State makes several arguments on rehearing regarding the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) regarding prematurely filed notices of 
appeal. (See Respondent's Brief on Rehearing, pp.4-7.) However, the State's 
contentions on this narrow issue are ultimately irrelevant to this Court because the State 
has cited no authority whatsoever for the proposition that a request for an appeal, 
clearly conveyed to trial counsel prior to a judgment becoming final, is somehow 
rendered a legal nullity or otherwise inoperative simply because the request was made 
prior to the formal entry of a judgment of conviction and sentence. 
Mr. Gosch has been unable to find a single published opinion in Idaho, nor from 
any federal or state court, where a request for an appeal was made prior to a judgment 
becoming final, but was deemed to be ineffective as a request because the defendant 
asked counsel to file an appeal prior to formal entry of a judgment of conviction and 
sentence.3 Notably, the State provides no citations to any such authority to this Court in 
support of its position upon rehearing. A review of the published case law regarding an 
attorney's duty to file an appeal upon a request from a client to do so reveals no such 
limitation. 
3 There is one unpublished opInion issuing from the Idaho Court of Appeals that 
indicates such a result, in part based upon a concession of the appellant on appeal. 
See Saxton v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 561, p.4 (Ct. App. July 24, 2012.) 
As an unpublished opinion, the Saxton opinion cannot be cited as authority in future 
cases. Moreover, the Saxton opinion cites to no other authority for the proposition that 
a request for an appeal must be made within the time frame during which a notice of 
appeal may be filed in order to be effective. Accordingly, this opinion appears to be an 
aberration in the case law. 
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Beginning with the United States Supreme Court Opinion in Roe v. Flores-
Onega, the Court made clear that, where an attorney has been made aware of his or 
client's desire for an appeal in a criminal case, that attorney's obligation is clear and 
unequivocal: the attorney must perform the purely ministerial task of filing a notice of 
appeal in accordance with the client's wishes: 
We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions 
from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is 
professionally unreasonable. This is so because a defendant who 
instructs counsel to initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to 
file the necessary notice. Counsel's failure to do so cannot be considered 
a strategic decision; filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task, 
and the failure to file reflects inattention to the client's wishes. 
Flores-Onega, 528 U.S. at 477 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
There is absolutely nothing in the Court's language in Flores-Onega that 
remotely suggests that a client who requests that counsel file a notice of appeal must do 
so only after a formal judgment of conviction has been entered in order for the request 
to be effective. Rather, the Flores-Onega Court clearly held that the duty to file a notice 
of appeal is triggered by the simple act of communicating the defendant's desire for an 
appeal - once this instruction is communicated and understood by counsel, then 
counsel has to obligation to accede to this request by filing a timely notice of appeal. 
This is consistent with all of the published case law in Idaho dealing with the 
failure of trial counsel to file a timely notice of appeal upon the request of his or her 
client. Uniformly, this case law speaks to counsel's duty to file an appeal upon the 
request of the defendant, and none of this case law has any language conditioning the 
efficacy of such a request upon the entry of a formal judgment of conviction and 
sentence. See, e.g., Hoffman v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1059-1060 (Ct. App. 2012) ("An 
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attorney who disregards specific instructions from a defendant to file a notice of appeal 
acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable."); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 
269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002) ("An attorney who disregards specific instructions from a 
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 
unreasonable."); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Where counsel 
refuses a defendant's request to appeal, prejudice is presumed."); Wilbanks v. State, 
126 Idaho 341,345 (Ct. App. 1994) ("When a defendant directs his attorney to take an 
appeal, and the attorney neglects or refuses to do so, a deprivation of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel occurs."); Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 360 
(Ct. App. 1994) ("Where a defendant advises his or her attorney of a desire to appeal, 
and the attorney fails to take the necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant 
has been denied his or her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at a 
critical stage of the proceedings."; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1993) 
("Where a defendant a,sks his attorney to appeal and the attorney refuses, the 
defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel."); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 
588,593 (Ct. App. 1993) (same); Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,940 (Ct. App. 1990) 
("Where a criminal defendant advises his attorney of his desire to appeal, and the 
attorney fails to take the necessary steps to file the appeal, the defendant has the basis 
for a claim that he has been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel."); 
Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 194-195 (Ct. App. 1983) ("It has been held that where a 
criminal defendant advises his attorney of his desire to appeal, and the attorney fails to 
take the necessary steps to file an appeal, the defendant has been denied his 
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constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the 
proceedings."). 
The State has provided no legal authority to this Court for the proposition that a 
request for an appeal that is tendered following a jury verdict, but prior to formal entry of 
a judgment of conviction and sentence, is a legal nullity or otherwise inoperative to 
trigger counsel's duty to fulfill this request. Accordingly, this Court should deem the 
State's argument regarding the provisions of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) waived, as the State has 
shown no authority that the provisions of this rule have any material bearing on the 
issues at stake in this appeal. State v. Zitchko, 129 Idaho 259,263 (1996) (claim that is 
unsupported by both argument and legal authority is waived on appeal). In fact, the 
case law on this issue reflects no such conditioning of the defendant's right to appeal on 
the making of a request only after the formal entry of a judgment of conviction. 
An additional point of clarification is necessary to address the State's contentions 
on rehearing. The State appears to suggest that Mr. Gosch's argument on appeal is 
that trial counsel was under the obligation to file a notice of appeal at the very moment 
that the jury returned its verdict of guilt in this case. (Respondent's Brief on Rehearing, 
pp.5-6.) The State thereafter claims that, "Given the state of the law, as set forth above, 
filing a notice of appeal immediately after the verdict and before sentencing would 
create an enormous risk that the appeal would be dismissed." (Respondent's Brief on 
Rehearing, pp.6.) 
If the State is characterizing this as Mr. Gosch's claim on appeal, then the State 
is substituting a straw-man for Mr. Gosch's actual claim. Mr. Gosch never claimed that 
trial counsel was obligated to file a notice of appeal at the very instant that the jury's 
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verdict was announced. Rather, Mr. Gosch claims that, upon being clearly informed of 
Mr. Gosch's desire for an appeal immediately following the verdict, trial counsel in this 
case tendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal 
at all. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.12-21; Reply Brief, pp.3-7.) At no point in the briefing 
in this appeal, or at oral argument before this Court, did Mr. Gosch argue that the filing 
of the notice of appeal itself had to occur immediately following the jury's verdict and 
prior to the entry of the judgment of conviction. Mr. Gosch's contention on appeal is 
rather that his act of communicating his desire for an appeal was legally effective, 
regardless of whether the request itself was tendered before the formal filing of a 
judgment of conviction and sentence. Following the clear communication of this 
request, the duty of counsel thereafter was to file a timely notice of appeal. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.12-21; Reply Brief, pp.3-7.) 
Upon trial counsel hearing and understanding Mr. Gosch's request for an appeal, 
which is a fact not in dispute in this case, it was incumbent upon trial counsel to act 
upon it by filing a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
This is amply borne out by the standards of law regarding those cases where a 
defendant has expressed his or her desire for an appeal. And this was correctly 
recognized by this Court when it initially determined that Mr. Gosch was entitled to post-
conviction relief. The State's implied assertion to the contrary is in error. 
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I/, 
Assuming, Arguendo, That Trial Counsel Is Permitted To Disregard A Clear Directive To 
File An Appeal Where That Directive Is Made Prior To Formal Entry Of A Judgment Of 
Conviction And Sentence. Under The Facts Of This Case. Mr. Gosch's Request For An 
Appeal Was Legally Effective Under The Application Of I.A.R. 17(E) And Case Law 
Regarding The Validity Of Prematurely Filed Notices Of Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the legal efficacy of a request for an 
appeal made by a criminal defendant to his or her counsel is tied to the time frame 
governing when a notice of appeal is effective, as provided for by court rule, Mr. Gosch 
asserts that his request for an appeal following the entry of a jury verdict in this case is 
nonetheless effective pursuant to I.A.R. 17(e)(2) and case law interpreting this 
provision. 
B. Assumino, Arguendo. That Trial Counsel Is Permitted To Disregard A Clear 
Directive To File An Appeal Where That Directive Is Made Prior To Formal Entry 
Of A Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence. Under The Facts Of This Case, Mr. 
Gosch's Request For An Appeal Was Legally Effective Under The Application Of 
I.A.R. 17(E) And Case Law Regarding The Validity Of Prematurely Filed Notices 
Of Appeal 
Mr. Gosch continues to vigorously assert that there is no legal basis in support of 
the State's claim that the request for an appeal by a criminal defendant to his or her 
counsel has no legal effect if made prior to the formal entry of a judgment of conviction 
and sentence. However, assuming arguendo that the request for an appeal is tied to 
the time limits provided for by court rule as to when a notice of appeal may be initially 
filed, Mr. Gosch asserts that his request for an appeal immediately following the jury's 
verdict would fall within the provisions of I.A.R. 17(e)(2), which make liberal provisions 
for the premature filing of notices of appeal. 
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Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides for the filing of premature notices of 
appeal, and provides in pertinent part that, "A notice of appeal filed from and appealable 
judgment or order before formal written entry of such document shall become valid upon 
the filing and placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment or 
order, without refiling the notice of appeal." I.A.R. 17(e)(2). Final judgments of 
conviction, as well as judgments imposing sentence following a conviction, are both 
recognized as appealable orders. See I.A.R. 11 (c)(1), (6). Under the case law, a legal 
conviction occurs when a verdict is accepted by the trial court upon a finding of guilt 
following trial. United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 404-407 (2008); State v. 
Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273,278 (1978); I.C. § 19-2317. 
Under the liberal construction that this Court applies to prematurely filed notices 
of appeal, Mr. Gosch submits that the entry of the jury verdict in this case, and his 
request for an appeal upon such, falls within the ambit of I.A.R. 17(e)(2). Two of the 
primary cases cited to on rehearing by the State actually support this conclusion. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. Gissel is particularly instructive 
for this Court, given its elaboration of the sharp departure from prior case law regarding 
prematurely filed notices of appeal that was occasioned by the adoption of I.A.R. 
17(e)(2). See State v. Gisse/, 105 Idaho 287, 289-290 (Cl. App. 1983). After 
discussing the prior state of the case law, which dismissed those appeals where the 
notice of appeal had been filed prematurely, the Gissel Court turned to the effect of the 
adoption of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The court noted: 
This amendment clearly calls in line with the authorities from other 
jurisdictions which recognize that a premature notice of appeal - filed after 
the pronouncement of an otherwise appealable decision but before entry 
of a written order, decree, or judgment - is not a nullity but is held in 
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abeyance and matures upon the filing by the clerk of a formal written 
judgment, order or decree. The approach reflected by this amendment is 
a diametric change from the earlier decisions of our Supreme Court 
concerning premature notices of appeal. It indicates to us a policy of 
judicial fairness, preserving appeals for determination on their merits 
rather than penalizing litigants for their eagerness in seeking 
appellate review. 
Gisse/, 105 Idaho at 290. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Inv., LLC., also relied on by the State on rehearing, lends additional support 
for Mr. Gosch's claim. See Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC., 148 Idaho 
616,618-621 (2010). While the appellant in Spokane Structures originally filed a notice 
of appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment - which is not an 
appealable order - the Court ultimately held that this did not require dismissal of the 
appeal due to the operation of I.A.R. 17(e)(2). Id. That was because the Court 
determined that the notice of appeal became valid once the entry of the final judgment 
occurred. Id. at 621. 
Finally, the State's argument ignores case law indicating that the provisions of 
I.A.R. 17(e)(2) are to be construed liberally in favor of determining the merits on appeal. 
See Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 654 (Ct. App. 2008) In Weller, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals deemed a notice of appeal from the district court's notice of intent to dismiss in 
a post-conviction case to be within the ambit of I.A.R. 17(e)(2), even though such an 
order was not, of itself, a final appealable order. Id. at 653-654. The court did so on the 
basis that, "our state appellate courts have generally been liberal in their treatment of 
premature notices of appeaL" Id. at 654. Moreover, the Weller Court held that the 
"adoption of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) indicates a 'policy of judicial fairness, preserving appeals for 
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determination on their merits rather than penalizing litigants for their eagerness in 
seeking appellate review.'" Id. (quoting Gisse/, 105 Idaho at 290). 
In this case, the return of the jury verdict constituted a legal conviction in 
Mr. Gosch's underlying case. A judgment of conviction is itself an appealable order 
under the appellate rules. Accordingly, even if a request for an appeal must be made 
following the issuance of an appealable order, the operation of I.A.R. 17(e)(2) would 
apply to extend a request made following the entry of a jury verdict of guilt in a criminal 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gosch respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case with instructions 
for the district court to vacate and re-enter Mr. Gosch's judgment of conviction in his 
underlying criminal case so as to permit him to file a notice of appeal. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2012. 
~" ~! .//~ /A /./.~~. ~ 
--"'SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appel/ate Public Defender 
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